Congressional Seat Swings: Revisiting Exposure in House Elections by Ronald Keith Gaddie
699
RESEARCH NOTE
Congressional Seat Swings:
Revisiting Exposure in House
Elections
RONALD KEITH GADDIE, THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA
Oppenheimer, Stimson, and Waterman’s exposure thesis of partisan change
contends that shifts in the partisan composition of Congress are related
to the long-term stability of the electoral system. Applying their exposure
model to elections from 1962-1994 produces seat change estimates that
generally follow the actual data pattern, but these estimates produce large
predictive errors. When the exposure model is reestimated using data
from 1962-1994, exposure is not significantly related to partisan seat
swings. This article advances a seat change model that relies on an alter-
nate measure of exposure: the net exposure of the president’s party in
open seats. Open-seat exposure is significantly related to the partisan
seat swing, and substantially improves on the economic evaluation/surge-
and-decline/ exposure model of seat change. In an era of high incumbent
security and strategic retirement from Congress, the balance of open seats
is a better indicator of partisan vulnerability, and better reflects the nature
of partisan exposure.
Aggregate seat swings in Congress are often related to economic trends
and political shifts in the electorate. Changes in the partisan balance of Con-
gress are often interpreted as referenda on presidential popularity or on policy 1
NOTE: I wish to thank James E. Campbell, Brad Lockerbie, and Richard W Waterman for
their comments and suggestions regarding this research, and the editors and anony-
mous reviewers for their helpful suggestions and constructive criticisms. Any er-
rors of interpretation or fact reside with the author. Direct all correspondence to
Ronald Keith Gaddie, Department of Political Science, University of Oklahoma,
Norman, OK 73019. Email: rkgaddie@ou.edu.
1 For example, the 53-seat GOP swing in 1994 was widely viewed as a personal rebuke of
Bill Clinton and his policy initiatives. Other dramatic mid-term seat shifts have been
similarly interpreted as no-confidence votes.
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The existing literature has clearly found that there is a presidential pulse to
congressional elections: the president’s party gains seats in accordance with
the strength of the president’s victory, and subsequently loses seats in the
midterm &dquo;decline&dquo; (Campbell 1997). Research on this phenomenon goes back
at least as far as the works of Bean (1950), and subsequent research indicates
that the presidential pulse demonstrates historic persistence (Campbell 1997,
1991).
Among the more prominent theories to explain the shift in congressional
seats is the exposure thesis (Waterman, Oppenheimer, and Stimson 1991;
Oppenheimer, Stimson, and Waterman 1986). The advocates of the exposure
thesis contend that, in addition to economic and political pulses that create a
rhythm in congressional elections, the president’s party gains or loses seats
relative to its &dquo;surplus&dquo; of seats, compared to the party’s equilibrium seat share.
When the president’s party has more seats than the equilibrium for the elec-
toral system, it is overexposed and will lose seats; when that party has fewer
seats than the equilibrium, it is underexposed and will gain seats.
Waterman, Oppenheimer, and Stimson’s most recent demonstration of
exposure (1991) covered elections since the 1870s, although their full model,
which incorporates economic growth and presidential popularity data, ana-
lyzed elections from 1946 forward. A careful examination of congressional
seat swings indicates that there is a problem with the application of exposure
to aggregate seat swings after 1960. This brief article advances a modified seat
swing model-the open-seat exposure model-that reflects the nature of con-
gressional elections in the incumbency era. The predictive accuracy of the
original exposure model is subjected to two tests for the 1962-1994 period.
The underlying argument for using open seats to measure exposure is pre-
sented, and open-seat exposure is tested with other controls. The accuracy of
the open-seat model is compared to the exposure models.
CONGRESSIONAL SEAT SWINGS AND THE FAILURE OF EXPOSURE
Aggregate seat swings in Congress are related to national political and
economic factors. Initial research in this area tied congressional election swings
of the president’s party to the magnitude of the winning party’s plurality 2
Strong presidential performances resulted in long coattails that pulled addi-
tional seats in for the winning party (Campbell 1997; A. Campbell 1960).
Midterm elections followed with a corresponding drop-off in presidential party
support, and a related falloff in seats (Bean 1950; A. Campbell 1960).
2 See James E. Campbell (1997) for a comprehensive overview of the surge-and-decline
debate.
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA LIBRARIES on January 20, 2016prq.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
701
Campbell’s (1991) incorporation of the surge and decline of presidential sup-
port into a measure of the &dquo;presidential pulse&dquo; of congressional elections cap-
tured the strength of the president’s party in the election year through the
coattail effect, and then lagged the inverse of that strength at the midterm to
indicate the vulnerability to midterm decline. Economic evaluations, which
are also important to determining seat change, are included in the major fore-
casting models.
In addition to these political and economic indicators, Oppenheimer,
Stimson, and Waterman (1986) argued that there was an equilibrium in con-
gressional elections that helped determine the partisan swing in a given elec-
tion. Exposure worked effectively in explaining seat swings, according to their
analysis, and the model improves over the explained variance of surge and
decline models and economic responsibility models.
Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s a variety of macromodels were
frustrated in their ability to predict seat swings. The 1994 election was par-
ticularly galling, as a 53-seat Republican gain shattered the crystal balls of
many forecasters, who predicted seat gains of between 4 and 26 seats by the
GOR3 Exposure fared among the worst of these, predicting a shift of 16 seats
to the GOE4 Why?
Political science has documented a variety of changes in the dynamic of
congressional elections since the 1960s that are too numerous to document in
this brief note. However, the period of increased incumbent security observed
by Mayhew (1974) and otherS5 coincided with the departure of exposure as a
predictor of congressional seat swings. This result leaves questions regarding
the appropriateness of exposure-as defined-as a predictor of seat swings. In
Figure 1 the predicted seat swings for the president’s party are graphically
presented, based on the 1946-1988 exposure model. The actual seat change
for the president’s party is also presented. The estimated exposure prediction
3 Interestingly, at a roundtable on forecasting at the 1994 Southern Political Science Asso-
ciation Meetings that immediately preceded the November 8 election, the forecasts of
Lewis-Beck, Abramowitz, and Campbell, when summed together, indicated a 52-seat
GOP gain. This was probably not the intended method of prediction by the college of
forecasters.
4 The exposure model prediction is estimated using coefficients from Waterman,
Oppenheimer, and Stimson (1991), multiplied by the values for the independent vari-
ables in 1994. The coefficients and variable values (parentheses) are: constant, -67.85;
exposure, -.73* (-1.14); surge and decline, .44*(-6.00); presidential approval, 1.02*(47);
change in real disposable income, 3.30*(1.70).
5 See Niemi and Weisberg (1993), Jacobson (1990), or Campbell (1997) for an overview
of this literature.
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- FIGURE 1
EXPOSURE THESIS SEAT SWING PREDICTIONS, 1962-1994
from the 1946-1988 model generally moves with the actual seat swings, but
sizable errors are evident between the expected and actual seat changes in
several cases. The average error for the exposure model is 16.5 seats for elec-
tions since 1962 (14.6 seats if 1994 is excluded).
To give exposure another chance, the model of exposure was reestimated
using data from 1962-1994 (Table 1). The dependent variable is the incum-
bent president’s party’s net seat change in the House of Representative. The
four independent variables specified are the public evaluation of the president’s
performance (presidential approval rating); the change in real disposable in-
come ; the presidential surge and decline; and the exposure term for the
president’s party6 The results of the analysis in Table 1 indicate no relevance
of exposure to contemporary House elections. The exposure term and the
presidential approval rating failed to achieve statistical significance, and the
slope coefficients for both are far less steep than in the analysis by Waterman,
6 Data are drawn from congressional elections from 1962 to 1994. The dependent vari-
able of interest is the net number of seats gained or lost by the president’s party in U.S.
House elections. Presidential responsibility is measured with the last Gallup support
score for the incumbent president prior to the election. The change in real disposable
income is measured as the net percent change in RDI over the last year, as of the third
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Stimson, and Oppenheimer (1991). When the 1994 election is excluded from
the analysis the fit of the model improves, but the exposure and presidential
responsibility terms still fail significance.’ 7
If we re-estimate the model using from 1962 forward, we obtain an im-
proved fit for the model but lose significance in two variables of interest. The
failure of exposure can seem disheartening, because the term &dquo;exposure the-
sis&dquo; and the theoretic rationale behind exposure-that a president’s party per-
forms well or poorly based on the vulnerability of its assets-have an
intellectually attractive aesthetic quality Why does exposure fail?
EXPOSURE RECONSIDERED
Large seat swings usually depend on multiple marginal wins by the
advantaged party The relatively low variation in congressional seat changes,
especially since 1974, reflects the increased incumbent security since the end
M TABLE 1
THE EXPOSURE THESIS AND SEAT CHANGE SINCE 1962
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < .05, one-tailed test ** p < .01, one-tailed test
quarter. The direction and the size of the presidential surge and decline are measured as
the net two-party plurality of the winning presidential party in presidential years, and
the inverse of that plurality in the midterm (see Campbell 1997). This analysis uses the
same measure of exposure as Waterman et al. (1991), the presidential party’s seats held
prior to the election minus the equilibrium value for that party (the average of House
seats held by the party for the period examined).
7 Campbell (1993) demonstrated that exposure did not contribute to explaining seat
swings after World War II. Waterman and his colleagues concede that the applicability
of the exposure equilibrium declines with the aging of the party system. The loss of
significance for exposure after the second decade of the New Deal realignment con-
forms to this admission.
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of the 1950s; there simply are fewer marginal seats.8 It is reasonable to assume
that the growth of incumbent security diminished the exposure effects in con-
gressional elections. An oft-forgotten aspect of David Mayhew’s classic article
on vanishing marginals lends wisdom to understanding this problem. Mayhew
noted (1974: 30) that &dquo;if fewer House members are winning elections nar-
rowly, and if the proportion of ’open seats’ per election [is] not rising, it ought
to follow that congressional seat swings are declining in amplitude.&dquo; The de-
cline of Mayhew’s marginals coincides directly with the beginning of the 1960s.
If, at the end of the 1950s, incumbents were able to increase their electoral
security and isolate themselves from partisan swings, it would stand to reason
that the extent of partisan seat changes in that era would be confined to dis-
tricts without incumbents.
Research on open seats finds latent partisan effects in those races. On
average about 20 percent of open seats &dquo;flip&dquo; to the district out-party The
partisan switches in open seats are not evenly distributed across parties in a
given election, but instead follow the same cyclical pattern demonstrated by
all congressional elections. The proportion of open seats that change party is
far greater than the proportion of incumbent seats.
One reason open seats are substantively important for explaining macro-
level changes in Congress is the vulnerability of those elections to partisan
tides. Mondak (1993) and Flemming (1995) found that presidential coattails
were more pronounced in open-seat elections than in incumbent races.9 While
these authors disagree on the details of coattails in open-seat contests, both
are in agreement that national political tides have an increased impact on
congressional elections when incumbents are absent.
8 Jacobson (1987) argued that the marginals did not decline, but rather that the band of
vulnerability which encompasses marginal seats expanded from 55 to 60 percent of the
vote. Bauer and Hibbing (1989) disputed Jacobson, contending that the incumbent
defeats that support Jacobson’s argument were the product of idiosyncratic electoral
factors such as incumbent scandals.
9 There is a pulse to the net partisan swings in open seat and incumbent elections. Net
swings are far more pronounced in the open seats. The proportional incumbent and
open-seat swings of the same magnitude in only two years (1964 and 1982). Generally,
the proportional swing in open seats has been to the detriment of the GOP, which also
goes far in explaining its inability to capture the House before 1994 (see Gilmour and
Rothstein 1993). The largest proportional GOP gains in open seats occurred recently
(1980, 1984, and 1994), and were in years where partisan or economic trends (or
both) favored the GOP. The GOP only made net proportional gains through open seats
on two other occasions (1966 and 1972), again under conditions favoring Republican
pickups. Large Democratic gains through open seats similarly occurred during Repub-
lican midterms.
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How does one translate the vulnerability of open seats at the district level
into a relevant measure of seat change at the national level? Lockerbie (1995)
made such an initial translation in his effort to improve the anemic showing of
the Lewis-Beck and Wrighton (1994) forecast model for the 1994 election. In
his model, the number of open seats was multiplied by a nominal term indi-
cating whether 60 percent of the electorate correctly predicted a gain by the
president’s party or the out-party This model produced an average predictive
error of 9.3 seats, which is substantially better than the 16.5 seat error of the
original exposure model. Evidence of strong relationships between open seats
and national political trends at the district and aggregate levels indicates that
the creation of more open seats should increase the influence of national trends
in determining the composition of Congress.
Lockerbie’s study is a step in the right direction, but comes up short on
two dimensions: (1) it cannot produce a pre-election forecast, because the
critical open-seat term requires a post-election assessment of the electorate’s
prognosticating ability; and (2) the interacted open-seat term does not ac-
count for the balance of exposure of open seats, that is, which party has more
seats exposed to the greater partisan tides in open-seat elections.
Open-seat exposure is a product of incumbent retirement, and the distri-
bution of retirements is rarely proportionally distributed. Gilmour and
Rothstein (1993) observed that Republican incumbents retired at a greater
rate than Democrats from 1970 to 1990. They ascribed the lingering GOP
congressional minority to the impact of greater Republican exposure through
open seats (see also Abramowitz 1991). Democrats have retired in dispropor-
tionate numbers in the 1990s, and the GOP has taken advantage of those
retirements: since 1992, Republicans have gained a net of 33 seats vacated by
Democrats. If one party has a disproportionate number of retirements, or sim-
ply has more retirements than the other party, they will have fewer opportuni-
ties for seat gains, due to the position of running defensively in more seats
that are at risk. In an era where open seats are by far the normal avenue for
advancement to Congress, the exposure of a political party should be consid-
ered in the context of the potentially high-risk seats that a party has exposed.
The impact of open-seat exposure on the seat should be greater than the
potential seats to be lost by the overexposed party One reason for increased
incumbent security has been the increase in strategic incumbent retirements.
The surfeit of political information available to incumbents allows them to
read the electoral tea leaves, and then determine when to leave Congress with-
out the embarrassment of electoral defeat. Moore and Hibbing (1992: 827)
noted in their overview of retirements in the 1970s and 1980s that &dquo;retire-
ments generally occur on the basis of rational calculations concerning ad-
vancement potential, chances of securing reelection, and perhaps financial
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considerations.&dquo; In other words, legislators consider the potential benefits of
remaining where they are, the cost and effort required to stay there, and then
act strategically in their own best interests. If incumbents of one party per-
ceive a potentially difficult reelection due to the vulnerability of their party in
national elections, they should be more prone to retire. The disproportionate
flight of incumbents from one party may signal a general vulnerability that is
not reflected in the general exposure measure. Such vulnerability will en-
hance the relationship between open-seat exposure and the partisan seat swing.
THE OPEN SEAT EXPOSURE MODEL
To test the relationship between open seats and partisan seat swings, a mea-
sure of open-seat exposure is developed. Open-seat exposure is calculated as the
net number of open seats the president’s party has exposed (Open Seatspres - Open
Seatsout).1° A positive value indicates the president’s party has more open seats at
risk, and is overexposed. A negative value indicates the president’s party is under-
exposed, and has the potential for substantial seat gains via open seats.
The equation from Table 1 is reestimated with the control for open-seat expo-
sure included in the model. The results of that analysis appear in Table 2.11 Open-
seat exposure is a significant predictor of the House seat swing in elections since
1962. When compared to the exposure models in Table 1, the explained variance
increased by 17 points for the analysis of elections from 1962 to 1994, and in-
creased by 8 points when 1994 is excluded from the analysis. The fit is better than
that of Waterman et al.’s exposure model, and 12 points better than Lockerbie’s
(1995) economic seat change model. The estimated seat swings generated by the
open-seat exposure model are displayed along with the actual seat swings from
1962-1994 in Figure 2. The average error is 6.33 seats (4.94 seats when 1994 is
excluded), a one-seat improvement over the model in Table 1 and two orders of
magnitude improved over the estimates generated by the original exposure model.
Even with the inclusion of the 1994 election the model generated predictions that
are a snug fit to the actual seat swing (r = .91). The predicted change for 1994 is
23 seats, which improves over the Waterman et al. exposure model estimates by 7
seats, and over the model estimates based on the analysis in Table 1 by 14 seats. 12
10 Open-seat exposure data are obtained from issues of Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report.
11 A partisan-seats model that estimated Republican seat changes and included controls
for presidential party produced similarly robust results that are consistent with the
analysis below. Those results are available on request from the author.
12 Personal correspondence from James Campbell indicates that his model predicted a 26-
seat swing in 1994, and finds a 53-seat swing with a realigning dummy variable for
1994. The inclusion of such a realigning dummy variable in the model presented here
produces the same prediction (adjusted-R2= .92).
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- TABLE 2
OPEN SEAT EXPOSURE AND SEAT CHANGE
- FIGURE 2
OPEN SEAT EXPOSURE THESIS SEAT SWING PREDICTIONS, 1962-1994
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The open-seat exposure model (reduced) fared well in estimating the 1996
elections. The Waterman et al. model indicated an approximate Democratic
gain in the 1996 election of approximately 46 seats, which would have re-
sulted in a Democratic majority The open-seat exposure model forecast a far
more modest seat change-a gain of 5.76 seats by the Democrats. In 1996 the
Democrats gained a net of 10 seats, which falls just within the margin of error
for the open-seat exposure model.
CONCLUSIONS
The exposure thesis was an insignificant predictor of congressional seat
swings after 1962 because the nature of congressional elections changed dur-
ing the postwar era. Incumbent safety reached unprecedented levels that stifled
the immediacy of partisan change and constrained the number of vulnerable
seats that could conceivably switch. Turnover in Congress has come to rely
largely on the voluntary retirement of incumbents and the subsequent cre-
ation of open seats (Gilmour and Rothstein 1993). An empirical test that at-
tempts to explain seat change needs to consider the rationale behind
retirements, and what retirement communicates about the balance in the elec-
toral system.
When incumbent safety increases and turnover shifts to retirement, the
vulnerability of a party will be reflected in the decision of incumbents to forego
reelection. The disproportionate retirement of Republicans in the 1970s and
1980s had been ascribed to the limited rewards of minority party service and-
especially in the South-to the beckon of senatorial or executive posts that
offered more latitude to actively pursue a conservative agenda (Stanley 1992).
The recent exodus of House Democrats indicates that minority status and the
threat of losing can prompt retirement, as can the existence of cash incentives
such as campaign war chest conversion. Democrats continue to retire in greater
numbers than Republicans in the 1990s, and Republicans made substantial
gains in districts where Democrats departed, especially in the South.
Incumbents cultivate substantial electoral advantages, and they are prone
to anticipate departure rather than having it thrust upon them. The established
forecasting models, especially the exposure model, do not capture the degree to
which a party is electorally exposed in the era of incumbent safety The model
advanced in this article can generate forecasts in advance of elections, increasing
its utility By measuring exposure to take into account this differential between the
two parties, the open-seat exposure thesis finds more support empirically and is
more theoretically pleasing. Even though the original exposure thesis failed an
empirical test, the underlying theory-the presidents party strength in Congress
depends on its vulnerable seats-is theoretically important to the interpretation
and forecast of congressional elections.
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APPENDIX
ACTUAL AND PREDICTED SEAT CHANGES, 1962-1994
* Waterman, Stimson, and Oppenheimer (1991: 388).
* * Table 1.
* * * Table 2.
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